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Summary 
 
Driven by the financial distress of many social security systems worldwide, national 
public pension funds (PPFs) have proliferated in recent years. Considering the fact that 
in 2007, they managed assets globally by more than four trillion and a half dollars, 
oversight of these pension schemes is utterly warranted.  Since PPFs are ultimately 
financial intermediaries, strict regulation and close scrutiny of their stakeholders is 
desirable in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest between the owners and the 
managers of the funds, which are exacerbated in the case of pension funds administered 
by the public sector because of many reasons discussed in the paper. Governance 
standards should be equally rigorous as those applicable to private pension funds. 
Additionally, sound institutional structure is needed to keep under control undue 
political interference by promoting good practices of disclosure and accountability. 
According to several case studies, at present, national PPFs display heterogeneous 
standards in this regard.   
 
In light of their size and intrinsic governance shortcomings, there exists a pressing need 
for Guidelines of Good Practices for Public Pension Funds Governance that lays the 
grounds on which these particular institutional investors should be run to achieve their 
stated purposes.  The current document provides Guidelines proposing as key areas of a 
PPF the maximization of the risk-adjusted net return on the reserves, collections of 
contributions, payments of benefits, compliance enforcement, and account management. 
In turn, an environment conducive to the accomplishment of these objectives must be 
grounded on three pillars: (i) Internal Governance Structure: a good internal 
governance structure is one that ensures that the Fund will be administered by a 
committed and professional governing body where decisions are made after careful 
deliberation and agreement between its members in accordance to the Fund’s objectives 
and fully consistent with the long-term commitments made to plan members; (ii) 
Investment Policy: a good investment policy is one that clearly and explicitly sets forth 
in advance the short- and long-term asset allocation, its rationale in light of the Fund’s 
goal, the risks involved, and the tools to be used to deal with deviations from such goal; 
and (iii) Transparency and Accountability: it is crucial that relevant and timely 
information be disclosed to all stakeholders so as to facilitate monitoring and oversight 
of Fund authorities and actions be taken to detect and punish opportunistic behaviors 
and bad performance.  
 
After listing the principles recommended for a good framework of governance, 
accountability and transparency, the document develops a Manual that complements the 
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Guidelines with its technical rationale, some operational aspects and international 
experience as applicable.  
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Suggesting Guidelines for Public Pension Funds Governance 
 
I. Motivation and Background 
 
Driven by the financial distress of many social security systems worldwide, public 
pension funds (PPFs) have proliferated in recent years. According to Musalem and 
Souto (2009), who surveyed a sample of national PPFs corresponding to sixty eight 
mature and developing countries, in 2007, they managed assets globally by more than 
4.4 trillion dollars.  Considering the fact that the authors did not include the entire 
population of the national PPFs in their survey, the amount is conservative. Given their 
remarkable size and social impact, it is self-evident that oversight of these pension 
schemes is utterly warranted.  
 
On top of this, it must be recalled that PPFs are ultimately financial intermediaries. 
Financial intermediaries are strictly regulated and under the close scrutiny of their 
stakeholders. This vigilance is a reaction to well-known potential conflicts of interest 
between the owners and the managers of the funds. Such conflicts of interest are 
exacerbated in the case of pension funds administered by the public sector in view of 
the following features:  
 
(i) General government authorities may be prone to interfere in order to (i) divert 
accumulated resources to other uses, particularly the funding of operating fiscal 
expenses, (ii) allocate funds to investments that are deemed socially strategic without 
proper regard to standard return-risk considerations, and (iii) appoint managers based on 
political affiliation and connections rather than skills;  
(ii) PPFs face no market competition, which eliminates a major source of discipline and 
induced efficiency;  
(iii) These funds are simultaneously sponsored and regulated by the state, thus giving 
rise to an obvious conflict of interest that debilitates the required control and 
punishment over management misconduct and ineptitude;  
(iv) In those cases where the PPFs are governed by public sector wage guidelines such a 
wage structure curtails the ability to attract qualified human resources and provide them 
with productivity-linked incentives;  
(v) In defined benefit (DB) systems in particular, due to the absence of individual 
accounts, the asset ownership is diffuse and the resulting interest in controlling the fund 
applications is lessened; and 
(vi) Also in the case of funds covering current or future pensions in DB regimes, there 
may not be a readily measurable funding target against which to evaluate performance, 
which in turn undermines the incentives for good performance and for outsiders’ 
disciplining over the manager.  
 
These characteristics suggest that governance standards should be, at the minimum, 
equally rigorous as those applicable to private pension funds. Nevertheless, as the 
enforcing party, the State, is on both sides of the counter, a sound institutional structure 
is needed to keep under control undue political interference by promoting good 
practices of disclosure and accountability. At present, national PPFs display, on 
average, heterogeneous standards in this regard: an Index of Transparency and 
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Governance (TGI) estimated by Musalem and Souto (2009)
2
, with ranges of values 
between 0 and 33, show that the highest TGI correspond mainly to PPFs of developed 
countries (the Superannuation Fund of New Zealand and the Canadian Public Pension 
Fund  with 32 points, the Swedish AP1 with 29 points, the Swedish AP4 with 27 points, 
and the GEPF of South Africa with 27 points), while the lowest values are found in 
developing countries (2 points in the case of Zimbabwe’s pension fund and the two 
pension funds from Tunisia). In this regard, according to Mitchell’s (1993) findings 
administrative inefficiencies in public systems are not limited to developing economies. 
In fact, the author mentions the weak performance of US pension funds. Mitchell and 
Hsin (1997), argue that investment portfolios of US states public plans yield lower rates 
of return than portfolios of private sector pension funds.  Iglesias and Palacios (2000) 
compared the annual compounded real publicly managed pension fund returns and bank 
deposit rates in 20 countries, and found that the returns of most of the sample were well 
below the short term interest rates, with the exception of Japan, Korea, Philippines and 
Sweden.  Musalem and Souto (2009) show data on investment returns of national PPFs 
versus those of private pension systems for a few number of developed and developing 
countries. Subject to further statistical analysis, the small sample of data suggests that 
returns on investments of national PPFs in developed countries might be higher than 
those of private pension systems (except for the United States); while the opposite is 
observed for the sample of developing countries. Obviously, an important factor that 
might explain the above outcomes would be differential regulatory treatments. 
 
The term “PPFs” refers here to all government-managed funds (administered either by 
the social security department or any other government office) as well as those that 
outsource the investment function while maintaining legal responsibility over the 
funds
3
. Impavido (2002) categorizes PPFs as funds with publicly centralized 
management and, hence, with governments as important stakeholders. Once met this 
classification criterion, the concept broadly involves defined-contribution (DC) and DB, 
open and closed, mandatory and voluntary, personal and occupational, and national and 
subnational arrangements. On the contrary, it notoriously excludes the so-called second 
pillar, where governance is decentralized and fund management is delegated through 
free choice to private (and in some cases government-owned) companies.   
 
In light of their size and intrinsic governance shortcomings, there exists a pressing need 
for Guidelines of Good Practices for Public Pension Funds Governance that lays the 
grounds on which these particular institutional investors should be run to achieve their 
stated purposes.  Furthermore, many PPFs have been seeking to identify a Code of 
Good Practices from which they can use as a basis to strengthen the Governance, 
Accountability and Transparency of their schemes. 
 
The OECD has been deliberating about pension fund governance since 2000.  In 2001 
the Organization’s Working Party on Private Pensions approved guidelines on topic that 
were released as OECD Recommendation (OECD, 2005). Since then, governance has 
risen in profile and entered the policy agenda. There has been a substantial literature on 
                                                 
2
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text. 
3
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whose governing body is subject to Government appointment. The Swedish centralized management 
structure with full outsourcing may be included in the definition of “PPFs”. 
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private pension governance.  In Marossy and Yermo (2001) can be found in Book 2 a 
compendium for Emerging Economies with a range of policy issues and comparative 
surveys on private pensions activities. Ambachtsheer et al. (2006) analyze the findings 
of a survey on private pension fund governance, to which an international group of 
senior pension fund executives responded.  The authors found a positive statistical 
association between governance quality and private pension fund performance.  Stewart 
and Yermo (2008), after identifying main governance weaknesses of private pension 
systems, suggest a balanced representation of stakeholders in the governing body, more 
expertise and the use of codes of conduct. Musalem and Souto (2009) study states that 
overall country governance has a noticeable impact on the governance structure of 
national PPFs. Hence, the governance framework for a national PPF may not be 
dissociated from country characteristics.  
 
Although PPFs have not been at the core of the pension research agenda, some fruitful 
and ever-growing initiatives have been led by the World Bank, the International Social 
Security Association (ISSA) and the OECD in recent years. The World Bank organized 
in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 major international conferences on PPFs governance. 
The contributions of the 2003 conference were collected in a volume edited by 
Musalem and Palacios (2004). Other valuable pieces of work prepared in-house or 
commissioned by the World Bank are Iglesias and Palacios (2000), Palacios (2002), 
Vittas, Impavido and O’Connor (2008), Bebczuk and Musalem (2008), and Musalem 
and Souto (2009). The ISSA issued in 2004 the Guidelines for the Investment of Social 
Security Funds on which the present work partially draws on. Alongside, ISSA (2007) 
discusses the results of a quantitative survey among 20 PPFs. ISSA is presently working 
on guidelines for the governance of Social Security Institutions, and on a review of the 
2004 guidelines for the investment of Social Security Institutions. In turn, Yermo 
(2008) showcases the OECD work under way for this country group. Finally, Mitchell, 
Piggott and Kumru (2008) outlined a number of sound governance rules for pension and 
other public funds
4
. 
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applicable to these other public investment funds. 
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II. Structure of the Document 
 
The Guidelines propose as key areas of a PPF the maximization of the risk-adjusted net 
return on the reserves, collections of contributions, payments of benefits, compliance 
enforcement, and account management. In turn, an environment conducive to the 
accomplishment of these objectives must be grounded on three pillars: 
 
(1) Internal Governance Structure: Managing funds is an extremely complex and 
dynamic task requiring specific skills, market experience, and ethical integrity. A good 
internal governance structure is one that ensures that the Fund will be administered by a 
committed and professional governing body where decisions are made after careful 
deliberation and agreement between its members in accordance to the Fund’s objectives 
and fully consistent with the long-term commitments made to plan members. 
 
(2) Investment Policy: A good investment policy is one that clearly and explicitly sets 
forth in advance the short- and long-term asset allocation, its rationale in light of the 
Fund’s goal, the risks involved, and the tools to be used to deal with deviations from 
such goal.  
   
(3) Transparency and Accountability: Since fund managers are not the owners of the 
funds under their control, incentives may arise not to apply these resources in the best 
interest of plan members. Moreover, even well intentioned managers may turn out to be 
incompetent. It is crucial that information be disclosed to all stakeholders so as to 
facilitate monitoring and oversight of Fund authorities and actions be taken to detect 
and punish opportunistic behaviors and bad performance.  
 
Throughout the document, we will generally refer to the “governing body” as the organ 
with authority to put into effect the necessary actions for the scheme to comply with its 
legislative mandate. Its responsibilities should be in accordance with the social security 
scheme’s main objectives, which are to pay the benefits and provide the services 
promised.  This includes both investment management and non-investment management 
functions. Although some of these functions may be delegated to specific departments 
within the Fund or outsourced, as a norm the governing body retains a veto power and 
thus remains ultimately liable.  
  
The present document is divided in two parts. The first part, the Guidelines, just lists the 
principles recommended for a good framework of governance, accountability and 
transparency. In turn, the second part, the Manual, complements the Guidelines with its 
technical rationale, some operational aspects and international experience as applicable. 
Although there exist various organizational models and thus the guidelines are quite 
general in nature, the Manual will be as concrete and practical as possible in drafting 
operational courses of action (as opposed to abstract principles) that will hopefully 
serve for policy purposes. In the same vein, it is important to note that a good normative 
framework on paper is not equivalent to a successful model in practice. For the latter to 
materialize, an active engagement of all stakeholders and a careful implementation are 
required. Finally, these suggested best practices do not mean that alternative rules 
would inexorably lead to worse outcomes but that the likelihood is significantly higher, 
perhaps not in short periods but certainly over medium and long time horizons, which 
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are the ones that matter the most in pension planning. In other words, the adoption of 
these guidelines should turn the pension scheme much more resilient to misconduct of 
any particular administration and to contexts of overall economic and institutional 
fragility. 
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III. Guidelines of Good Practices for Public Pension Funds 
Governance 
 
Overriding Objective: PPFs should maximize risk-adjusted net return to plan 
members, together with collecting, managing, benefit processing and disbursement. 
 
1. Internal Governance Structure 
 
1.1 Prerequisites for good governance 
 
The governing body, managing institutions and contracted service providers should be 
vested with the power and resources to comply with the legislative mandate of the Fund 
and should also be accountable whenever it fails to meet its legal obligations.  
 
1.2 Governing Body 
 
The Fund should be administered by a specialized governing body, or by a government 
office with comparable conditions of professionalism, incentives, integrity, resources, 
and political independence. 
 
1.3 Investment Mission 
 
In accordance to the Fund’s objectives, the investment of the resources trusted to the 
Fund is a prime mission. Funds usually have boards that set investment policy and 
investment committees. 
 
1.4 Recruitment Policy 
 
The nomination, appointment and dismissal of members of the governing body should 
be conducted on a transparent and merit-based manner. 
 
1.5 Auditing  
 
An internal auditor, independent of all stakeholders, should be appointed to carry out 
the oversight of the financial, accounting, and legal processes. In turn, an Audit 
Committee should review the performance of the internal auditor.  
 
1.6 Actuary 
 
An actuary, independent of the governing body and its authorities, should be appointed 
to determine the financial solvency of DB Funds. 
 
1.7 Custodian 
 
Custody of the Fund assets should be trusted to a private or public institution with 
proven record in providing these services. Fund assets should in all cases be legally 
independent of other assets the custodian may be responsible for.  Fund assets should be 
legally independent of the assets of the managing institution. 
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2.  Investment Policy 
 
2.1 Investment Policy  
 
The governing body should set forth in a written statement and actively observe an 
overall investment policy aimed to attain the Fund’s objectives. 
 
2.2 Prudent-person Principles and Quantitative Restrictions 
 
The investment policy should be guided by a prudent-person standard. Quantitative 
restrictions may also be put in place as long as they do not inhibit the pursuance of the 
Fund’s objectives, or when the internal governance structure and/or the degree of 
transparency and accountability are deficient.  
 
2.3 Benchmarking 
 
The investment policy should determine operational financial targets or benchmarks 
against which the Fund’s financial performance can be measured up. 
 
 
 
3. Transparency and Accountability  
 
3.1 Disclosure and Reporting 
 
The governing body should disclose all relevant information to all parties involved in a 
clear, accurate and timely fashion.  
 
3.2 Relationship with the Executive 
 
The Fund operations should focus on fulfilling its legislative mandate and therefore 
should be subject to the least possible political interference.  
 
3.3 Relationship with the Legislative 
 
The governing body should report to the Legislative Power on a regular basis as a 
means of establishing proper checks and balances against inappropriate political 
interference by the Executive.  
 
3.4 Relationship with plan members  
 
Plan members and beneficiaries should be provided with all relevant information for 
making, if applicable, fully informed choices. 
 
 
3.5 Redress 
 
Scheme members and beneficiaries should be granted prompt statutory redress 
mechanisms through a body established for this purpose or through the courts.  
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3.6 Regulation and Supervision 
 
The Fund should be under the regulation and supervision of the organism that oversees 
other pension schemes in the country. Otherwise, it should be subject to the oversight of 
one of the financial regulatory agencies in place. 
 
3.7 External Audit 
 
The Fund’s accounting statements must be certified by an external auditor with 
adequate credentials. The audited statements should be disclosed along with all 
observations the external auditor might have made. 
 
3.8 Effective Accountability  
 
The governing body should be accountable to plan members and the competent 
authorities. Furthermore, the legal framework, the statute and the by-laws of the Fund 
should clearly state the criteria used to judge the performance of the governing body and 
the penalties applicable.  
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IV. Manual of Good Practices for Public Pension Funds 
Governance 
 
 
The core objectives of the PPFs should be toguether with collecting, account managing, 
benefit processing and disbursement, to strive for obtaining the maximum net return for 
a previously agreed level of risk. The net rate of return should be no less than the 
covered wage growth in DB schemes.  Similarly, the fund should seek to maximize the 
rate of return realized in each asset class, with the asset allocation undertaken in 
accordance with a framework which assesses both the evolution of the DB scheme’s 
liabilities as well as the historic and projected risk and return profiles of different asset 
classes.  While in the DB case the risk is pooled and in the DC it is born by the 
individual.   
 
In DB schemes, no preferences need to be identified.  The strategic asset allocation can 
be developed within an Asset and Liability Management (ALM) framework, where the 
overall risk is determined in terms of the consistency between assets and liabilities on 
the funds balance sheet. Even in a DC regime based on individual accounts, plan 
members differ in their preferences because of their age, risk attitude, financial 
sophistication and rationality. Still more complex is the case of a DB system, where 
there is no strict correspondence between contributions and benefits, and reserves are 
intended to fund current or future pensions. Still the appropriate risk tolerance as well as 
target returns for different asset classes can be determined.  For example, in private DB 
schemes, actuaries use the projected wage growth plus a factor (often 150-250 basis 
points) as the assumed rate of return for a scheme.  With this assumption, they 
determine the funding strategy and sufficiency of reserves.  The supervisor can review 
this and other assumptions used.  Similarly, it is possible to use such a threshold as one 
performance benchmark for performance of a public scheme.  In addition, since public 
schemes guaranteed by the Government (Govt) are setting aside fiscal resources for the 
future, some countries use the long term (LT) rate of return on Govt LT securities as a 
performance benchmark.  Of course investing in Govt paper would be less risky than 
commercial debt or equity but the projected cost of debt can serve as a basis for 
expected returns and, in addition historic volatility on government paper can be used as 
a basis for anticipation of volatility on similar assets. 
 
As mentioned by Musalem and Pasquini (2009) DB pension funds were badly hit by 
declines in equity prices and interest rates at the beginning of the current century. This 
gave way to a switch form DB to DC plans in many firms around the world in order to 
avoid the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) requirements. This 
process was accelerated by the recent financial crisis.  The mentioned authors cite Ponds 
and van Riel (2007) which describe the Dutch pension systems as a passage from an 
end-of-period-pay DB schemes to average-pay DB system with DC elements as a 
hybrid system; thus introducing a risk sharing mechanism among participants and 
sponsors. 
 
The governing body should in advance provide stakeholders with an operational 
definition of the sought risk-adjusted net return, so as to allow the latter to scrutinize 
investment performance. This definition may be given in the form of an absolute real 
return or a benchmark index. For additional guidance on potential benchmarks see 
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Investment Policy section below. Regardless of its particular formulation, it is crucial 
that the objective be quantifiable and easy to understand and monitor by all 
stakeholders.  
 
It must also be noted that the Fund should maximize net real returns, that is, gross 
returns minus operating and administrative costs, expressed in inflation-adjusted local 
currency terms. This measure emphasizes the need to simultaneously maximize returns 
and minimize the associated management costs. In the case of DC schemes it reflects 
the impact on members’ future consumption.  
 
As said before, the governing body besides concentrating its efforts on financial returns 
must be held accountable for collections of contributions, benefit processing and 
disbursement, compliance enforcement, account management, and other related 
functions of social security institutions.  Given their social and political connotations, 
these roles may threat the technical independence required for a wise portfolio 
management, by inducing other actors -most notably the government, the labor unions 
and the employer associations- to demand direct participation in fund management 
decisions without having the specific expertise in financial matters. While the separation 
between portfolio management and other pension-related tasks is clear-cut in DC 
regimes, this may be questionable in DB systems, where funding requirements create a 
linkage between financial management and benefits. However, the legislative 
framework should clearly establish the different functions of the pension regimes. The 
core objectives of the PPF should not include other development objectives such as 
improving the country’s economic development or investing funds for any purpose 
beyond risk-adjusted net return maximization.  
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1. Internal Governance Structure 
 
1.1 Prerequisites for good governance 
 
The governing body, managing institutions and contracted service providers should be 
vested with the power and resources to comply with the legislative mandate of the Fund 
and should also be accountable whenever it fails to meet its legal obligations. The 
standard upheld to Board and Management members of a public scheme embodies the 
concept of exercising “duty of care”.  Under this principle, a member is requested to 
exercise the duties with honesty and diligence, seeking the best interests of the social 
security scheme and its members. Accountability requires no political interference. 
 
Over and beyond the particular governance structure chosen, it is essential that the 
governing body satisfies some prerequisites for doing its job (see Box 1). These 
conditions include:  
 
(i) Powers and Responsibilities: Legislation, institutional policy or decree must 
establish the grounds for the powers and responsibilities of the Board and Management, 
with a clear separation between both
5
. 
 
(ii) Adequate accountability rules: The counterbalance of legal powers must be the 
disciplining power exerted by the government and other stakeholders in case the 
governing body does not comply with its mandate. This clearly contributes to align the 
incentives of all parties involved. However, as will be explained in more detail later on, 
sanctions should be triggered when acting in bad faith or in the event of long-term 
underperforming. Nevertheless, penalties should avoid inhibiting financial innovation 
and reasonable risk-taking.  
 
(iii) Political and budgetary independence: Letting alone the rights and obligations 
prescribed by the law, the governing body should not be subject to government 
interference with its portfolio decisions. Although the government should retain the 
right to request explanations from the governing body, it should not be allowed to 
request prior approval or veto actions already taken. Financial decisions should be as 
free as possible from political or strategic goals other than maximizing the risk-adjusted 
net return. To this end, it is desirable that the Fund have its own budget, financed with 
Fund’s resources under rules and the scrutiny of the competent authorities, in particular 
the Congress. The underlying reason is that when Fund expenses are covered with 
general fiscal revenues, the government is more able to coerce the governing body into 
following its directives. 
 
(iv) Financial and technical resources: The governing body should be supplied with 
sufficient resources to recruit qualified personnel, seek the advice of outside experts, 
acquire state-of-the-art information and communication technology (ICT), and make 
other critical expenses needed to accomplish its goal. 
 
                                                 
5 While the Board refers to the governing and policymaking body of the Fund, the Management is in 
charge of the PPFs’ administration and implements the Board’s resolutions. 
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(v) Professionalism: Financial decisions must be in the hands of highly professional 
fund managers with proven experience in the field. It must be clear from the outset that, 
regardless of the social implications of a pension system, managing a pension fund 
remains exclusively a financial matter. If possible, the key governing body members 
should be selected from among prominent market players, not only because this is a 
signal of good track record but also because these executives face a larger reputational 
cost in case of failure, which increases their incentives for better performance. 
Furthermore, besides being politically independent, managers should be independent 
from the financial industry, so as to prevent self-dealing and other transactions with 
related parties at the expense of the affiliate.  
 
(vi) Incentives: To avoid the low productivity syndrome often attached to public sector 
jobs, the members of the governing body should be equipped with correct incentives to 
perform. Competitive wages with a partial component of performance-based, variable 
income should be part of the package, along with the previously mentioned negative 
incentives – i.e., reputational costs and legal liability.  The latter implies that there 
should be an external authority that takes legal actions against the Board or 
Management and that it may have a protection for whistleblowers. 
 
 
 
Box 1: Canada’s Pension Plan Investment Board:  
Management & Governance 
 
 The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is a defined benefit plan providing pension 
established in 1966.  In 1996, an actuarial report projected the plan‟s small 
contingency reserve would be exhausted by 2015. A year later, the provinces and the 
federal government reached agreement on deep reforms to the CPP that gave way to 
the creation of the CPP Investment Board. 
 
 “The distinct governance model of the CPP Investment Board, one that balances its 
arm‟s length relationship with governments with strong public accountability, is set out 
in legislation. 
 The investment professionals of the CPP Investment Board report to an independent 
board of directors. 
 Directors are appointed by the federal finance minister in consultation with his 
counterparts in the participating provinces and assisted by an external nominating 
committee with private sector involvement… (see Box 4, Section 1.4). 
 ...The board of directors hires the CEO, sets investment policies, reviews 
performance, approves external investment management partners, sets 
compensation for management linked to long-term performance and appoints 
independent auditors. 
 The composition of the board and the amending formula for the legislation keep the 
operations of the CPP Investment Board independent from governments. 
 A stringent code of conduct compels members of the board of directors and 
management to report any attempted political influence of investment decisions. 
 
The CPP Investment Board is a professional investment management organization. 
There are at least four key attributes that distinguish it from Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and other forms of state-sponsored funds. 
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 Governance structure. The CPP Investment Board‟s governance model was 
designed to prevent political interference and is enshrined in the Canada Pension 
Plan Investment Board Act. 
 An investment-only mandate. By design, CPP Investment Board decisions are not 
influenced by government direction, regional, social or economic development 
considerations, or any other non-investment objectives. 
  Transparency. The CPP Investment Board disclosure policy states: „Canadians 
have the right to know why, how and where we invest their Canadian Pension Plan 
money, who makes the investment decisions, what assets are owned on their behalf, 
and how the investments are performing.‟ This belief is demonstrated by more than 
1,200 pages of disclosure on the CPP Investment Board website, mandatory 
quarterly and annual disclosure of financial statements, and the public disclosure of 
portfolio holdings. 
 Segregated assets. Unlike sovereign funds, Canada Pension Plan assets are not 
government assets and are not dependent on tax revenues. The Canadian 
government is neither a sponsor nor guarantor of the plan.” 
 
Source: http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/fact_sheet_q3_2010.pdf 
 
 
1.2 Governing Body 
 
The Fund should be administered by a specialized governing body, or by a government 
office with comparable conditions of professionalism, incentives, integrity, resources, 
and political independence. 
  
Several good practices have been advanced by ISSA and OECD to deal with the notable 
conflicts of interest that appear in PPFs.  One of the most important issues, developed 
recently, that countries have to deal with is the independence of the governing body of 
the PPFs from excessive political interference. The fiduciary law should determine the 
Board’s responsibilities and make them accountable.  It is essential a clear process for 
the appointment of capable board members together with transparent procedures for 
their removal and performance evaluation system.    
 
The governing body can be either a government ministry (such as the Ministry of Social 
Security, Labor, or similar), the Social Security office (usually with the status of a 
Secretary or Under-Secretary within a Ministry), or an autonomous entity. A priori, in 
most cases an autonomous entity appears as the preferable option for several reasons 
(see Yermo, 2007): (i) it has greater clarity in mandate and objectives, insofar it can be 
kept from being involved in other pension-related tasks; (ii) for similar reasons, it is 
more transparent and accountable; (iii) it is more independent from government 
influence; and (iv) it has more flexibility in recruiting and compensating qualified 
human resources, most needed in the board and senior management positions. 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, the prevailing model by far is a tripartite board composed by 
representatives from the government, employers, and workers. The tripartite model may 
suffer government intervention that, as pointed out earlier, may result in inefficient 
outcomes. There is no guarantee that seats in the board are granted to individuals with 
financial and pension-specific background.  Musalem and Souto (2009) found 
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information about the composition of the decision making bodies of 69 PPFs, where 43 
of them had the so-called tripartite body.  While in some funds the representatives were 
chosen by their respective constituencies, in others they were appointed at the 
government discretion.  Such is the case of Bahamas, Bahrain, Malaysia, Nepal, and 
Philippines among others.  The authors highlighted that only in few countries, e.g., 
Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand, the board members were nominated by their 
professional qualifications rather than by a particular constituency, in order to assure 
autonomous management (See Boxes 2 and 4 in Section 1.4, and Box 12 in Section 
3.2). 
 
Indeed, in many countries the approach in terms of tripartite governing body should be 
reviewed to enhance independence and accountability as well. In countries where it 
would be politically unfeasible to avoid the tripartite board, a compromising alternative 
would be to vest it with a supervisory role, with no material bearing on investment 
policies except for consultative or formal enactment purposes, while appointing a sound 
governing body in charge of setting out the major investment guidelines. Additionally, 
external experts should be used regularly in the definition and accomplishment of PPFs 
policies. 
 
 
 
Box 2: Diversity in the appointment of board members 
   
The Board of Directors of Employees Provident Fund (EPF) of Nepal forms 
“the top most level in the hierarchy of the organization structure of EPF. The Board of 
Directors of EPF is constituted of the following seven members: a Chairman appointed 
by Nepal Government, three Directors nominated by Nepal Government from different 
government services, two Directors nominated by Nepal Government from banking, 
financial and corporate sectors, Administrator of KSK.” 
 
Source: http://www.epfnepal.com.np/Pages/Content/Board.aspx 
 
 
In Ireland, “the members of the National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission 
are appointed by the Minister for Finance. Under the National Pensions Reserve Fund 
Act, the Minister may only appoint people with substantial expertise and experience at a 
senior level in a number of specified areas as follows: 
 investment or international business management,  
 finance or economics, the law,  
 actuarial practice,  
 accountancy and auditing,  
 the Civil Service, trade union representation,  
 the pensions industry,  
 consumer protection.” 
 
Source: http://www.nprf.ie/Commission/commission.htm 
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1.3 Investment Mission 
 
In accordance to the Fund‟s objectives, the investment of the resources trusted to the 
Fund is a mission of the governing body besides other functions (e.g., collections of 
contributions, payments of benefits, compliance enforcement, and account 
management).  
 
The provision of pensions involves multiple and heterogeneous tasks, including 
actuarial assessments, the actual collection and payment procedures, and the investment 
of idle resources and member contributions. The fund management mission is quite 
specialized and should be conducted independently of other social security activities. 
This is, as a matter of fact, a basic cornerstone of financial intermediation: the 
intermediary (be it a bank, an insurance company, or a pension fund, for that matter) is 
not concerned about the income and expenses of the investor, but only cares about how 
to allocate the funds according to the investor’s preferences. In the social security arena, 
the concentration of these assignments in only one organism may bring about 
conflicting results: just as an example, in DB systems under financial distress, there may 
be some pressure to boost returns even at the price of excessive risk-taking and against 
the best judgment of the fund manager.
6
  
 
Regardless of the internal organizational structure, the ultimate responsibility for the 
investment decisions should lie with the governing body. This point is not trivial, as the 
governing body may delegate investment strategies and asset selection to specialized 
firms. The first best is to appoint a competent governing body with the required 
financial background, and creating an Investment Committee in the board for a closer 
oversight and performance evaluation. This is efficient because it simplifies the decision 
process and because incentives are better aligned when the decision making and the 
legally responsible units are the same
7
 (See Box 3). This is not to say that the governing 
body should not seek the advice of outside specialists and scholars –who may be even 
summoned to integrate a stable Consultative Investment Panel- nor that it should not 
consult with authorities and regulators in the financial area. Much to the contrary, these 
exchanges are likely to become a valuable contribution, particularly at the stage of 
designing or revising investment policies. Of course, the weaker the financial 
orientation of the governing body, the stronger the need to outsource this function to 
market experts.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 It can be argued that the same kind of pressure on the Fund’s financial policy can be exerted by the 
government social security office. But the difference is that, being a different institution and provided that 
the government body has enough autonomy, the Fund may refuse to engage in investment strategies that 
are considered too risky. 
7
 This is especially important in designing the long-term portfolio strategy. The particular asset selection 
emerging from such policy choice may more easily be trusted to first-rate global fund managers. 
8
 When the whole financial portfolio strategy and fund management functions are outsourced, the obvious 
emerging question is what role the governing body actually plays. 
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Box 3: Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund  
Investment Committee 
 
The Pension Reserve Fund of Chile benefits from a Financial Committee.  This 
Committee “provides advice to the Ministry of Finance on the fundamental aspects of 
the investment policy… The Committee is made up of renowned professionals with 
extensive experience in the areas of finance and economics.  
The Committee meets to discuss and adopt recommendations to be submitted to 
the Minister of Finance for approval… by law the Committee should meet at least once 
every six months…       
   The Financial Committee is supported by a specialized team from the Ministry 
of Finance that is led by the International Finance Coordinator. The team is also made 
up of several economists and a lawyer from the International Finance Unit, as well as 
the head of the Budget Office Public Finance Division, the head of Finance 
Programming and two analysts from that division. 
In order to ensure transparency the Committee publishes all of the minutes of its 
meetings and makes public statements on its main recommendations on investment 
policy for the funds. Annually it reports on the state of the funds to the Finance 
Ministry, to Finance Commissions of the lower house of Congress and the Senate, and 
to the Special Joint Budget Commission of Congress.”  
 
Source: http://www.minhda.cl/english/fondos_soberanos/comite_financiero.php 
 
 
 
1.4 Recruitment Policy 
 
The nomination, appointment and dismissal of members of the governing body should 
be conducted on a transparent and merit-based manner. 
 
The success of a Fund, whatever the chosen organizational structure, crucially depends 
on the ability to recruit well-trained and engaged financial experts and to get rid of those 
who do not perform as expected. In order to limit discretionality and political 
interference, the legal framework must clearly specify the ethical and professional basis 
under which members to the governing body are to be nominated and appointed, as well 
as the reasons for dismissal. As some activities may be outsourced, the law in general 
and the subsequent normative should establish the precise rules governing the hiring 
and dismissal of outside managers and consultants.  
 
The starting point is to set up a Nominating Committee (see Box 4, and Box 12 in 
Section 3.2) within the governing body to take care of submitting a list of candidates, 
assessing performance while in office, and advising the destitution of incompetent or 
dishonest ones; the Committee may also have a say in shaping the salary structure. Once 
again, in politically appointed boards (as is usually the case in the tripartite model), the 
Nominating Committee should incorporate or seek advice from well-informed market 
participants to identify the best candidates. Being the Fund in the realm of the public 
sector –which is not the same as saying that it is a government office-, official 
appointments and dismissals may be formally made from among the proposed 
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candidates by the President with Congress agreement. The term for these appointments 
should be limited (say, 3-4 years), but with the option to be reappointed for successive 
terms. In this way, there may be room for removing unfitted members while preserving 
and capitalizing on the experience of the good ones. 
 
Principles  that should be  taken into account are: (i) representatives of specific 
stakeholder group must have a verifiable process with which one can determine they are 
representing such groups; (ii) there should be terms which overlap the maximum period 
of governing for the legislative and executive branches; (iii) If appointed by the 
President or Prime Minister, removal should be only for just cause, for which standards 
would be proscribed; and (iv) 3
rd
 party verification of minimum professional and ethical 
standards is essential. 
 
 
Box 4:  Canada´s Pension Plan Fund  
Nominating Committee 
 
Directors of the Canada Pension Plan Fund “are appointed by the federal 
finance minister in consultation with the participating provinces, and with the 
assistance of a nominating committee, for a term of three years. 
The nomination process is designed to ensure that only those with expertise in 
investment, business and finance are appointed to the board. 
The chair of the nominating committee is federally appointed, and each 
participating provincial government appoints one representative.  The nominating 
committee recommends candidates for appointment and re-appointment to the federal 
finance minister.  In turn, the federal finance minister makes the appointments in 
consultation with the provincial finance ministers. 
The legislation disqualifies certain individuals from being directors… 
 
… The board conducts a confidential annual peer review to assist each director 
in identifying self-development initiatives and assist in providing the external 
nominating committee with guidance when it considers individual re-appointments” 
 
Source: http://www.cppib.ca/About_Us/about_our_board.html 
 
 
1.5 Auditing   
 
An internal auditor, independent of all stakeholders, should be appointed to carry out 
the oversight of the financial, accounting, and legal processes. In turn, an Audit 
Committee should review the performance of the internal auditor.  
 
As in other organizations, the internal auditor should be empowered to overseeing the 
reliability of financial reports, the disclosure practices, the internal control and risk 
management systems, and the regulatory compliance if applicable (see Box 5). 
Eligibility criteria should be similar to those for members of the governing body, except 
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that the very governing body should be responsible for the appointment. The auditor 
must report his or her findings to the governing body, calling special attention on 
negative developments and recommending appropriate remedial actions. If these are not 
promptly taken, the auditor should report to other competent authorities. The existence 
of an Audit Committee is highly desirable.  This Committee, formed by members of the 
governing body and/or outside specialists, should review the performance of the internal 
auditor and also participate in the choice of the external auditor.  
 
The external auditor should satisfy minimum requirements, such as professionalism and 
code of conduct, and legal liability for good faith disclosure. 
 
 
 
Box 5: The Finance and Audit Act of the  
National Pensions Fund of Mauritius  
 
The Committee that administers and manages the National Pensions Fund of 
Mauritius (NPF) “shall not later than 3 months after the end of every financial year, 
prepare and submit to the Director of Audit- (a) an annual statement of the receipts and 
payments of the Fund for that financial year; and (b) a balance sheet made up to the 
end of that financial year showing the assets and liabilities of the Fund.  
… The Committee shall, as soon as practicable after the end of every financial 
year, furnish to the Minister- (a) a report on the activities and financial position of the 
Fund during that financial year; and (b) a copy of the audited accounts of the Fund for 
the financial year together with the auditor's report on those accounts. 
The Minister shall, at the earliest available opportunity, lay a copy of the annual 
report and audited accounts of the Fund before the Assembly. 
 
Source: http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/ssns/file/welfareelderlyreg.pdf 
 
 
1.6 Actuary 
 
An actuary, independent of the governing body and its authorities, should be appointed 
to determine the financial solvency of defined benefit funds. (see Box 6). 
  
Actuarial services should be hired in DB schemes to assess financial solvency in the 
face of uncertainty regarding mortality, fertility, unemployment, income and other 
variables with direct impact on contributions and benefits in the short- and long-term. 
The governing body must be kept informed about actuarial sustainability of the system 
in order to adjust its investment policies if deemed necessary, and inform the 
responsible authorities to take immediate action to correct deficiencies. If the Fund is 
responsible for setting contribution and benefit levels (which is not advisable, as 
forcefully argued earlier), the actuary must report directly to other competent authorities 
and stakeholders if the governing body does not take into account his or her 
recommendations. An Audit Committee (formed by members of the governing body 
and/or outside specialists) should review the performance of the actuary and be involved 
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in the actuary selection process. In case of need this committee could also hire an 
external actuary to benefit from their technical opinion. 
 
The actuarial review process is an essential part of the review of the disability and 
survivorship benefits, sufficiency of funding etc. and reviewing the assumptions and 
parameters for annuities in DC schemes. 
 
 
 
Box 6: Final Report of the actuarial valuation of the Disability,  
Old-Age and Death Insurance Reserve Fund of Costa Rica 
 
“In turn, the Superintendency of Pensions, hired the Mexican firm Nathal 
Actuaries and Consultants, to conduct an actuarial study to the Disability, Old Age and 
Death Regime. 
The document was challenged by the actuaries of the Social Security 
Costarrience Fund (CCSS), because, in their view, it has serious conceptual and 
methodological shortcomings. 
 
   The matter will be settled by a report prepared by the highest ranking expert in 
the field: the International Labour Organization. 
Under the principle of transparency, both the signature Nathal report and the 
comments to this final report, by the actuaries of the CCSS are presented” in the 
following link:  
http://www.ccss.sa.cr/html/transparencia/transparencia.html 
 
 
1.7 Custodian 
 
Custody of the Fund assets should be trusted to a private or public institution with 
proven record in providing these services. Fund assets should in all cases be legally 
independent of other assets the custodian may be responsible for and independent of the 
assets of the managing institution. 
 
A custodian institution should be designated to safekeeping the Fund’s assets (See Box 
7). There are three sets of functions which  are subject to their own standards: (i) the 
custodian should be responsible for the safe-keeping of financial and non-financial 
assets and be subject to a series of custody requirements and be subject to a number of 
disclosure requirements; (ii) a bank or other financial intermediary may be contracted to 
manage the receipt of transfers, contributions and disbursal of benefits; and (iii) a 
separate information manager or service provider can be contracted for the purposes of 
disclosure of individual entitlements or of collective account information or both. 
 
These funds should be maintained in a legally separated account from other assets held 
by the custodian in order to isolate the Fund assets from the default risk of the 
custodian. As it is likely that this role be reserved to a public sector-owned bank, which 
in turn have governance problems of their own and are usually subject to heavy 
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government influence, it is important that all legal and accounting safeguards be taken 
to discourage the misuse of the Fund’s assets. 
 
 
 
Box 7: Custodian institution of the  
Employees’ Provident Fund of Sri Lanka 
 
In terms of the Section 5 of the Employees‟ Provident Fund (EPF) of Sri 
Lanka Act, No. 15 of 1958, “the Monetary Board of the Central Bank is vested with 
the responsibility… as the custodian of the Fund, (besides)…investing the excess 
monies of the Fund in securities as the Board may consider fit and sell those 
securities. The overall investment process with the investment objectives and the 
guidelines has been explicitly stipulated in the Investment Policy Statement of 
EPF”.  
Source: http://www.epf.lk/A_Fund_mgt21.htm 
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2. Investment Policy 
 
2.1 Investment Policy  
 
The governing body should set forth in a written statement and actively observe an 
overall investment policy aimed to attain the Fund‟s objective. 
 
The document should include the long-term asset allocation by asset class and its 
rationale in light of the goal of maximizing the risk-adjusted net return. The document 
should provide some indication of the desired risk and return profile of the Fund, and 
the justification for it. The investment policy should establish clearly the financial 
objectives of the Fund and the manner in which those objectives will be achieved. The 
investment objectives should be consistent with the retirement income objective of the 
Fund, and thus should satisfy, in addition to the relevant legal provisions; the principles 
of diversification and matching of assets and liabilities if applicable (see Box 9 in 
Section 2.3). 
  
Pension programs vary in design, but usually they are classified in two broad types: DC 
and DB. Under a DC plan, each employee has an account into which the employee 
(and/or the employer) makes regular contributions. Benefits depend on total 
contributions and net investment earnings of the account. The employee bears all the 
investment risk and the retirement account is by definition fully funded. A DC plans 
investment policy is similar to that of an individual deciding how to invest the money in 
an Investment Retirement Account (Bodie, 1988). 
 
Under a DB plan, the employee´s pension is determined by a formula that takes into 
account years of service and salary. The pension promised to the employee is the PPF´s 
liability. DB pension funds are pools of assets that serve as collateral for these 
liabilities. Beneficiaries presumably want pension plans to be as well-funded as 
possible. However, their preferences with regard to asset allocation policy are less clear. 
Literature seems to view, in the case of private sector´s pension liabilities, as divided 
into retired and active. Pensions owed to retired participants are nominal, and pensions 
accruing to active participants are real. The nominal benefits can be immunized or 
hedged by investing in fixed-income securities with the same duration or the same 
pattern of cash flows as the pension flows. Accruing pensions have a very different 
investment policy: “an actuarial interest rate” assumption becomes the target rate for the 
pension asset portfolio. The possibility of receiving a rate of return below or above the 
actuarial assumption will affect the asset allocation decision favoring an asset portfolio 
with a truncated and positively skewed probability distribution of returns (Bodie, 1988). 
 
The investment policy for DC programs in which members are allowed by law to make 
investment choices (multiple funds) –although unusual at present among PPFs- should 
ensure than an appropriate array of investment options, including a default option, are 
provided for members and that members have access to the information necessary to 
make investment decisions. In particular, the investment policy should classify the 
investment options according to the investment risk that members bear (Bodie, 1988). 
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It should also contain the associated means of monitoring performance in absolute terms 
as in relative terms to the benchmark, managing risks, and reviewing the policy in place 
if needed. Legal and normative provisions affecting the investment policy, most notably 
the existence of quantitative restrictions, must be clearly highlighted and its expected 
impact on portfolio profitability, security and liquidity explained. The document should 
be approved and issued by the governing body, which should also be the ultimate 
responsible for its content, regardless of whether the actual drafting is commissioned to 
a third party in the event that the governing body members (even those composing the 
Investment Committee) lack the required technical stature.  
 
Finally, as far as implementation is concerned, the investment policy should address: (i) 
how assets are priced: for traded and liquid securities, market values should be used; for 
illiquid assets, a fair valuation methodology, properly disclosed and tested, should be 
adopted; and (ii) whether internal or external investment managers will be used, the 
range of their activities and authority, as well as the process by which they will be 
selected and remunerated and their performance monitored. 
 
At the international level, it is uncommon to find PPFs that observe these principles (see 
Bebczuk and Musalem (2008) and Musalem and Souto (2009)). Funds do not publish a 
detailed investment policy, although in some countries, particularly in the OECD area, 
annual reports give a loose account of the current and future strategy. Governing bodies 
are probably reluctant to provide more information because of the fear of being held 
liable for an inferior outcome vis-à-vis the proposed strategy.  
 
However, it must be clear in the eyes of all parties involved the distinction between the 
investment policy and the investment performance. An investment policy is a strategic 
plan consisting of allocations and risk management mechanisms, founded on historical 
and expected returns and the needs and preferences of plan members. The investment 
performance is the realized outcome that may or may not coincide, period after period, 
with the expected one. Over long periods (say, at least 3-5 years), actual performance 
should be more or less in line with the benchmarks established in the investment policy, 
and that is why public knowledge of the latter helps assessing the governing body. This 
implies that legal provisions and stakeholder activism should push for a well-founded 
investment policy, while at the same time investment performance evaluations should 
be based, not on short-term but on medium- to long-term returns, where the noise 
introduced by transitory market fluctuations are presumably smoothed out. The longer 
the performance evaluation period, the less likely is that performance is explained by 
exogenous factors (as opposed to management skills). 
   
Some investment management public sector entities allocate part of their funds to 
external institutions for management (Box 8). External managers may have better skills 
or they may provide a higher level of safety. External managers can be valuable as a 
source of transfer of technology, advice and knowledge (training) and as basis for 
comparison (IMF, 2004). However, outsourcing of fund management would require 
issuance of terms of references consistent with the fund investment policy and strategy, 
and continue monitoring of their performance. Furthermore, outsourcing fund 
management will still maintain responsibilities on the fund governing body and fund 
managers for the fund performance.  
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Box 8: Outsourcing in the management of the  
Government Pension Fund Norway  
 
“The Ministry of Finance and Folketrygdfondet have… entered into… (an)… agreement 
for the management of the Government Pension Fund – Norway... 
… Folketrygdfondet is required to manage the Pension Fund in accordance with this 
agreement and within the framework established by … the laws, regulations, …for the 
management of the Pension Fund…  
In the management of the Pension Fund, Folketrygdfondet may… use external 
managers and other external service providers (outsourcing)… 
In the case of outsourcing, Folketrygdfondet maintains the full responsibility towards 
the Ministry of Finance for meeting… and has a duty to (ensure that): 
 …the internal control and the ability to monitor compliance with the obligations 
under this agreement are not impaired…;  
 … the service provider has the necessary competence… and …licenses required to 
perform the tasks…;  
 …the service provider supervises the outsourced functions and handles the risk 
associated with the task;…  
 …at all times (it has)… procedures to… monitor the service provider,… and handle 
the risk associated with the outsourced activities;  
 … (it takes)…measures if the service provider does not perform the task … 
satisfactorily;  
 …the service provider notifies Folketrygdfondet of changes… that may… influence 
the service provider‟s possibility to perform its tasks;  
 …the outsourcing contract can be terminated by Folketrygdfonde …;  
 …Folketrygdfondet and the service provider have a contingency plan…;  
 …Folketrygdfondet and the auditor have actual access to information related to the 
outsourced activity…;  
 …the service provider treats confidential information relating to Folketrygdfondet 
in a satisfactory manner.  
 
The first time external managers and other external service providers… for the 
management of the Pension Fund are selected, the Ministry of Finance shall be 
informed of the process…, and of the remuneration model used in the management 
contracts that Folketrygdfondet signs with external managers…” 
 
Source: http://www.ftf.no/en/c-309-Management-agreement.aspx 
 
 
2.2 Prudent-Person Principles and Quantitative Restrictions 
 
The investment policy should be primarily guided by a prudent-person standard. 
Quantitative restrictions may also be put in place as long as they do not inhibit the 
pursuit of the Fund‟s objective, or when the internal governance structure and/or the 
degree of transparency and accountability is deficient.  
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There are some guidelines to be considered when enforcing the prudent person principle 
in social security institutions: i) with internal investment units; ii) that have 
representation on the boards of companies where they have considerable asset holdings 
and iii) with external fund managers. In the first case, the investment unit must comply 
with the prudent person principle in managing the funds of the social security institution 
and carry out the investment policies set out by the Board/Management. The Board or 
Management determines whether the investment proposals have undergone due 
diligence and the valuation of the investment portfolio is in conformity with 
international market standards and pursues professional custody of the investment assets 
of the social security institution. For institutions with representation in Boards of 
Companies, the Board should ensure that its representatives on boards of companies 
only represent the interests of the institution. Regarding the institutions with External 
Fund Managers, the Board/Management must look forward that best practices are used 
when selecting the fund managers for the investment reserve funds of the social security 
institution and that the incentives of the external fund managers are lined up with the 
general investment objectives of the social security institution.  In order to enhance 
accountability and transparency, the institution must guarantee the separation of the 
investment assets that are managed by the external fund managers from their own 
operating assets. 
 
The regulatory and supervisory environment in many countries in practice is not so 
clear. Many pension funds with a prudent person rule have introduced quantitative 
limitations and many if not most PPFs have restrictions on overseas investments. The 
amount that can be invested abroad is a common restriction. The rationality of that is 
the fact that assets and liabilities are, in this way denominated in the same currency 
avoiding a costly hedging. A more profound motive is to limit the capital flows, whose 
volatility has been blamed for economic crisis in emerging countries. Finally, by 
limiting overseas investments, the argument follows; the policy is deepening domestic 
capital markets (Vittas, 1999). However, this approach may conflict with the overriding 
principle of maximizing the fund risk adjusted net return. 
 
Under a prudent person standard, the governing body is given broad authority to invest 
the Fund’s assets, relying on its care, diligence and skill in selecting a portfolio 
consistent with the Fund’s goal. Quantitative restrictions, in turn, are set for prudential 
purposes to strengthen portfolio’s security and liquidity (see Box 9). However, there is a 
serious dilemma at play, as the prudent person approach cannot be implemented in the 
presence of highly restrictive investment guidelines. Provided the governing body 
displays the desirable degrees of professionalism, incentives, integrity, resources, and 
political independence, and that proper transparency and accountability prevail, the 
prudent person standard decidedly dominates the application of quantitative restrictions. 
The reason is simply that it is highly unlikely that rigid investment rules –which often 
are not supported by any sound prior technical portfolio analysis tailored to the 
particular pension scheme- might yield worse long-term financial outcomes than those 
obtained by apt fund managers. Nevertheless, if governance and outside monitoring are 
not satisfactory, an intermediate model where the governing body is subject to some 
investment limits may be a (hopefully temporary) second-best solution –the first best 
being a well-governed, accountable and transparent governing body.  
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To this end, the legal provisions of the Fund should set minimum, basic investment 
criteria. Hence, it should avoid, to the extent possible, establishing quantitative 
restrictions on particular investments or any other detailed rules which may inhibit the 
ability of the investing body to attain the Fund’s goal and impair the flexibility to cope 
with unexpected, adverse market developments.  
 
Quantitative restrictions typically take the form of maximum shares (ceilings) in various 
asset categories and markets. Minimum limits (floors) are unusual, and should be 
avoided because they may jeopardize the ability to close or reduce positions in assets 
with poor prospects. Overall ceilings by asset class (equity, corporate bonds, 
government debt, deposits, and foreign assets) should also be avoided, because they 
tend to erect inefficient barriers to portfolio diversification. On the contrary, some 
limitations may be acceptable to prevent an excessive concentration in a given sector, in 
an asset, in a single issue, or in a single issuer. Derivatives should be allowed for 
hedging but not for speculative purposes. Illiquid securities (either traded or not) may 
also be limited but not necessarily prohibited, as they may represent profitable options 
for funds with a long-term horizon. Eligible issuers should be required to observe 
acceptable governance and disclosure practices. As long as the nature of their business 
is similar, it would be desirable that PPFs are subject to similar investment regulations 
(and other regulations for that matter) to those affecting private pension funds and other 
institutional investors.   
 
The adoption of high-quality accounting standards is a key element which facilitates the 
understanding and measures of the risks, the financial position on a consistent and 
comparable basis. In recent years a particular focus on IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards) has been on standard principles. Valuation issues in these 
standards are related to the widely approach of “marking to market” that requires that 
securities held for ready sale are properly reported at their market value in financial 
statements. For assets that do not trade on organized exchanges like real estate, a 
transparent valuation model could be used. To minimize valuation problems, investment 
rules could prohibit or limit holdings (World Bank, 2000). 
 
 
 
Box 9: Investment restrictions of the 
Government Pension Fund Global of Norway 
 
“The investment restrictions within this section apply to investments in equity and 
fixed income defined asset classes only.  
 The following limits apply to the maximum deviation between the actual portfolio 
and the benchmark portfolio: asset class 2.5 percentage points, geographical region 
5 percentage points, sector deviation in the equity portfolio 5 percentage points, 
government bonds (Treasuries) no restriction, other sectors in the fixed income 
portfolio 20 percentage points.  
 The overlap between actual portfolio and benchmark portfolio must be at least 60% 
for the equity portfolio and 40% for issuers in the fixed income portfolio.  
 The actual portfolio must not over time utilize more than 75% of the risk limits set 
by the portfolio‟s owners under normal market conditions. The risk limit is 1.50 
percentage points  
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 The issue of call options on individual securities that are not held in the actual 
portfolio is not permitted. Issuing of put and call options (measured as notional 
value) is limited to 2.5% of the portfolios‟ value.  
 Leveraging the portfolio is not permitted beyond what is necessary to minimize 
transaction costs or is a natural part of normal investment management, and not in 
excess of 7.5% of the market value of the portfolio.  
 Sale of securities that the portfolio does not own (short selling) may take place only 
in cases where NBIM has access to an established borrowing arrangement. 
Borrowing may not exceed 5% of the market value of the portfolio.  
 Lending of securities is permitted, provided that NBIM ensures that adequate 
security is provided for the loan. Loans of securities shall not exceed 35% of the 
market value of the portfolio.  
 It is not permitted to buy fixed income instruments with lower quality than 
investment grade for more than 1% of the market value of the Fixed Income part of 
the portfolio, and not more than 0.05 % of the market value of the Fixed Income 
part of the portfolio per single name.  
 Norges Bank must always retain at least one voting share in each company included 
in the portfolio to ensure that ownership rights can be exercised”.  
 
Source:http://www.norges-
bank.no/upload/78329/nbim%20public%20investment%20mandate%20spu%20dec09.p
df 
 
 
2.3 Benchmarking 
 
The investment policy should determine benchmarks against which the Fund‟s financial 
performance should be measured. 
 
 
A practical and carefully specified and documented benchmark index or financial target 
is the cornerstone of an effective accountability framework. It should be public, easily 
recognizable and understood by the scheme members. Let us recall that the goal of the 
benchmark is to provide all stakeholders with an external, observable, and objective 
yardstick that may be used to judge whether the governing body is doing a good job. 
Loose or obscure goals do nothing but to provide the governing body with arguments to 
shield itself from possible objections, and discourage the control exerted by trustees.  
 
Benchmarks should be tailored to the specific nature and contractual obligations of the 
system and should be ineludibly consistent with the stated Fund’s goal. Furthermore, 
the adequacy of the benchmark must be periodically reviewed. In light of the fact that 
both investment policies and benchmarks may vary over time in response to market 
changes, the legal framework should not specify a particular index to track nor should 
establish a particular benchmark-relative performance rule. The benchmark should play 
an ex ante performance incentive rule, by signaling the determination of the government 
and other stakeholders to keep a vigilant eye on the governing body and eventually 
terminate the contract with the appointment of new authorities if the mandated goal is 
not achieved (see Box 10). However, the failure to meet the target in any given period 
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may or may not necessarily carry an automatic sanction, unless it conveys a robust 
indication of systematic underperformance or professional misconduct. 
 
 
 
Box 10: Investment policy and benchmarks of the  
State Pension Fund of Finland 
 
The State Pension Fund of Finland (VER) “is external to the State budget, VER 
having been established to guarantee the payment of State pensions in the future and to 
balance the costs arising from that… 
The Fund‟s operations are governed by specific legislation. Moreover, the Fund 
has a Board of Directors appointed by the Ministry of Finance that decides on the 
Fund‟s investment principles and is responsible for its operations… 
VER ensures that its investments are secure, deliver a high return, can be 
converted into cash, and are appropriately diversified… 
Since no insolvency requirement is placed on the Fund, the characteristics of its 
investment operations are determined by the expected return and the choice of risk 
level. The return and profit targets set for the Fund in the operation guideline issued by 
the Ministry of Finance are as follows: 
 Long-term target return: 
In the long term, the State Pension Fund‟s investment activities must produce a 
higher return than an investment alternative that would be risk-free from the State‟s 
point of view. A risk-free alternative refers to the cost of the State‟s net debt, including 
the cost of derivative contracts made as part of debt management. Net debt refers to the 
difference between the State‟s budgeted debt and cash reserves. 
 Operational target return: 
The return on the State Pension Fund‟s investment activities, when adjusted for risk, 
must exceed the return of the reference index specified in the Fund‟s investment plan. 
 
Neutral basic allocation: 
The risk limits relative to the value of VER‟s investment portfolio set by the operation 
guideline issued on 13 November 2007 by the Ministry of Finance are as follows: 
 fixed-income investments must account for at least 45 per cent 
 equity investments may not exceed 45 per cent 
 other investments may not exceed 12 per cent 
VER‟s annual investment plan, approved by the Board of Directors, defines a neutral 
basic allocation for the investment portfolio, according to which investments are 
allocated for different investment categories. Here, the goal is to create a portfolio that 
yields the best possible return in the long run at the risk level set by the Board. Neutral 
basic allocation refers to an index-linked and feasible distribution of investments. It is 
continuously monitored and changed according to need. The neutral basic allocation 
guides investment operations in the long term”. 
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Source:http://www.statepensionfund.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=77802&GUID={A8D
F4DC9-FE7E-44FF-8851-728E4ADCF28C} 
 
 
 
Benchmarking, though, has some complications of its own. The downside of mandating 
to outperform, or at least not underperform, a given benchmark is that it immediately 
creates an incentive to track and replicate the benchmark index, which may not be the 
intended behavior. Moreover, with a peer-group index (i.e., not to underperform some 
industry average), the Fund may be compelled to mimic the portfolio of its competitors, 
in a so-called herding behavior that has been extensively studied in the context of 
private pension funds. Another problem is that the determination to beat the benchmark 
may induce the governing body to take excessive risks, which is not recommended at 
all.
9
 Additionally, benchmarking may become particularly complex in DB schemes, 
once portfolio strategy may be concerned about not only the correlation structure of 
asset returns but also the correlation with the growth of pension liabilities.  But 
regardless of these caveats, which are common to the whole institutional investment 
industry, depriving stakeholders from a quantitative yardstick would be quite 
troublesome when it comes to assessing governing body’s performance. 
 
Some simple benchmarks can be applied across the board: (i) calculation of real return, 
using the urban CPI; (ii) measurement of total real returns against real covered wage 
growth; and (iii) measurement of total real returns against the real rate of return on 91 
days; and one, five, ten and twenty years treasury securities.  Beyond that, each asset 
class likely needs to be measured against its own benchmark which then becomes very 
difficult to understand for the average member. 
 
It must be noted that the relevance and disciplining role of the benchmark heightens 
when investment choices are made under the prudent person standard. Otherwise, bad 
performance may be blamed on either the governing body or on the investment 
regulation, thus blurring accountability.  
 
                                                 
9
 In DC systems with multiple funds, benchmarking presents some additional difficulties when each of 
these funds offers a combination of various asset classes with distinct risk and return profiles.  
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3. Transparency and Accountability  
 
3.1 Disclosure and Reporting 
 
The governing body should disclose all relevant information to all parties involved in a 
clear, accurate and timely fashion.  
 
 
Without timely and complete information, the oversight bodies and the scheme 
members will have a low probability of detecting and penalizing wrongdoing.  
 
There are different clienteles demanding information, and the governing body should 
accommodate the supply to satisfy such different needs, adapting the content and 
presentation to the particular audience. For instance, for most scheme members and 
beneficiaries, the provision of highly detailed and technical information may likely 
represent an overburden rather than facilitating monitoring. But this does not preclude 
that specialized parties, such as auditors, actuaries, and pension experts do require 
thorough analytical data.  
 
It cannot be overstressed the importance of an easy-to-browse internet portal. 
Nowadays, this is the most widespread and less costly means of communication utilized 
by millions of people. Actually, hard copy reports, given their mailing costs and more 
limited outreach, are not a perfect substitute of an amiable and self-contained website.  
 
 Box 11 provides a minimum set of information that should be disclosed. 
 
 
Box 11: List of Disclosure Requirements for Public Pension Funds 
 
This box enumerates a series of specific data that, at a minimum, Funds should disclose 
to all scheme members and stakeholders. To start, some basic informational conditions 
to be met are: 
 Accuracy; 
 Timeliness; 
 Relevance (restricting the set of information to what the median stakeholder would 
require to make decisions);  
 User friendliness (presenting information in a clear and straightforward fashion 
and avoiding excessively technical data as well as an ambiguous wording); 
 Easiness of access (facilitating navigation through the website, and providing hard 
copies upon request); and  
 Effective contact information (meaning that phone calls, electronic mails, and 
personal visits are actively taken care of).  
 Grounded on these principles, the specific information set that should be disclosed 
includes the following: 
 
A. Legal Framework, Charters, and Bylaws 
 
The legal support of the Fund must be readily available for consultation. This 
comprises: 
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 The law of creation; 
 The main subsequent resolutions;  
 The charter and bylaws; 
 A Code of Corporate Governance; and  
 A Code of Director Conduct.  
 
B. Governing Body 
 Governance structure;  
 Nomination and recruitment procedures for managers and directors;  
 Independence and suitability of external managers and directors; 
 Detection and treatment of conflicts of interest;  
 Director tenure and term limits;  
 External directors‟ compensation;  
 Number, structure and membership of committees;  
 Frequency of Board and Committee meetings;  
 Board composition (number and integration by external experts, government 
officials and labor and employer representatives);  
 Directors‟ voting and veto powers; and  
 Causes of dismissal of managers and directors. 
 
C. Administrative and Legal Relationship of the Governing Body with National 
Government 
 Place and hierarchical status in the government organizational chart, or nature of 
the specialized organism (government-owned corporation, decentralized organism, 
private corporation);  
 Effective degree of administrative and financial independence;  
 Role of the government in appointing and dismissing Fund authorities; 
 Role of the government in setting and modifying investment policies and strategies; 
 Powers vested to the government to divert Fund assets to non-pension uses and to 
modify accumulation rules; 
 Government obligations to contribute to the Fund on a regular or extraordinary 
basis.  
 
D. Investment Policy 
 Details on decision making process, and the role, if any, of the Investment 
Committee and of external advisory services; 
 The short- and long-term goals and strategies, and their justification; 
 The legal and normative investment limits; 
 Bechmarking and performance evaluation; and 
 The asset valuation principles. 
 
E. Oversight and Accountability 
 External audit report; 
 Actuarial reviews, whenever applicable; and 
 Reporting to the Executive and Legislative Powers. 
 
F. Disclosure 
 
 Quarterly and annual reports; and 
 The Fund‟s website. 
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Minimum contents, presented in comprehensible terms, should cover the following 
aspects:  
 Objectives and mandate of the Fund; 
 Brief bio of senior management and Board members; 
 Organizational chart; 
 Staff number and professional profile; 
 Fund assets; 
 Itemized costs and revenues; 
 Investment allocations by asset class; 
 Investment returns, benchmarks, and performance evaluation; 
 Contact information (phone, physical address, electronic mail);  
 Member complaining and redressing mechanisms; 
 Complete frequently asked questions (FAQ) section; 
 Financial education section (benefits and risks of pension funds, calculators, 
consumer protection principles); and 
 Links to related government offices, local and international organizations, and 
external information sources. 
 
Source: Bebczuck and Musalem (2008). 
 
 
3.2 Relationship with the Executive 
 
The Fund operations should focus on fulfilling its legal mandate and therefore should be 
subject to the least possible political interference. Nevertheless, the independence of the 
Governing Body has to be counterbalanced with: (i) disclosure via periodic reporting; 
and (ii) supervision, to avoid corruption and illegitimacy 
 
In the case of private pension funds, the boundary between the fund manager and the 
public sector is well defined, with the former being overseen by the latter. Conversely, 
in PPFs, this boundary is blurred as a result of the dual role of the government as 
manager and regulator. The main prerequisite to keep political interference at arm’s 
length is to put in place an internal governance structure along the lines suggested 
previously in this document (see Box 12 in Section 3.3). This mission will turn more 
challenging for funds whose governing body comprises government representatives, 
since these officials are unlikely to take an independent stand on issues that conflict 
with political aspirations. Under these circumstances, the offsetting presence of 
knowledgeable and honest governing body members recruited from the private sector 
becomes critical.  
 
It is worth noting, nevertheless, that government involvement in the administration of 
the fund may not cause per se inefficient outcomes, nor the lack of direct involvement 
guarantees a truly independent ruling. The main concern with government interference 
is that it might force (i) a heavier investment in public debt beyond what would be wise 
for portfolio efficiency purposes, or (ii) a diversion of fund assets into fiscal non-
pension operating expenses that may jeopardize the actuarial solvency of the Fund in 
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DB schemes or cause an illicit expropriation of individual accounts in DC systems.
10
 
These problems are much more likely to occur in bad economic times, when fiscal 
financing needs are more pressing. On the contrary, during periods of solid fiscal 
stances and soaring financial markets, the risks of government mismanagement are 
largely subdued. This asymmetry implies that the oversight bodies should maintain an 
active surveillance even when performance indicators do not signal immediate problems 
on the surface. When a negative shock finally hits the Fund, it might be too late to start 
revamping the governance structure. 
 
 
As was just mentioned, another issue is that government interference may happen even 
under a fully private sector composition of the governing body, provided board 
members are appointed on the basis of political affiliation and have dubious 
professional and integrity standards. Close reliance on the governance principles 
previously outlined appears as the fundamental safeguard against direct or indirect state 
intrusion. Oversight bodies should of course exert an extreme vigilance on any warning 
signs of undue political interference, regardless of whether nominal independence exists 
in the law.  
 
3.3 Relationship with the Legislature 
 
The governing body should report to the Legislature on a regular basis as a means of 
establishing proper checks and balances against inappropriate political interference by 
the Executive.  
 
The Legislative is vested with the power to establish the key policy directions of the 
Fund and making sure that the Executive abides by them. In performing this mission, 
the Legislative enjoys the advantage of a leveled position in terms of institutional rank 
vis-à-vis the Executive compared to other external oversight bodies, which is a crucial 
asset in countries where the latter lack effective enforcing power. Therefore, it makes 
sense that the Parliament, after analysis at the level of a commission, should be in 
charge of approving (or not) the annual statements of the Fund (see Box 12), have the 
right to summon the governing body members to testify, and require correcting 
measures when needed, including the dismissal of Fund authorities.   
 
Regrettably, in fragile institutional settings, the Legislative rarely stands as a 
countervailing force to the Executive. The motives range from lack of technical 
competence or awareness about financial matters to the presence of a voting majority of 
the ruling political party.  
 
The governing body should submit at least once a year annual report to the Congress 
with information regarding policy investment, composition and performance of the 
fund. In addition, monthly information about financial statements should be submitted 
to the appointed supervisor for the social security. 
                                                 
10
 If the law makes a nil or loose reference to this problem, it would be difficult for any internal or 
external body to veto political-based decisions. This suggests that the drafting of the legal framework 
should strike a balance between flexibility in the actual management of the Fund and some limitations 
aimed to restrict discretionality in the investment and use of the assets. These limitations should not be 
confused with providing strict investment ceilings and floors, which should be avoided by all means. 
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Box 12: Independence of the governing body of the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
 
The New Zealand Superannuation Fund “is governed by a separate Crown 
entity called the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation.   
The entity is overseen by a Board. Its members are appointed by the Governor 
General on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance. The Minister's 
recommendation follows nominations from an independent nominating committee. On 
receiving those nominations the Minister must consult with representatives of other 
political parties in Parliament before recommending the Governor General appoint a 
person to the Board.  
Board members are chosen for their experience, training, and expertise in the 
management of financial investments.  
The Board must comprise of at least five, but no more than seven, members. 
Each Board member is appointed for a term of up to five years and is eligible to be 
reappointed… 
…While accountable to Government, the Guardians operate at arm's length 
from Government. Under the law, the Minister of Finance may give directions to the 
Guardians regarding the Government's expectations as to the Fund's performance, but 
must not give any direction that is inconsistent with the duty to invest the Fund on a 
prudent, commercial basis. The Guardians must have regard to any direction from the 
Minister. Any direction given by the Minister must be tabled in Parliament. The New 
Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 and the Crown Entities Act 
2004, both published on the website of the Parliamentary Counsel office, provide more 
information on the role and responsibility of the Minister. 
…An independent review of how effectively and efficiently the Guardians are 
performing their function is carried out every five years. The first review was conducted 
in July 2004.  
The Minister of Finance sets the terms of reference for the review, which is 
conducted by an independent person appointed by the Minister. The report is then 
presented to Parliament. Treasury monitors the activities of the Guardians on an 
ongoing basis on behalf of the Government.  
In 2008 the Guardians' Governance and Management of the Fund was subject to 
a review by the Office of the Auditor General.” 
 
Source: http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp?pageID=2145879271#independence-
from-government 
 
 
 
3.4 Relationship with plan members  
 
Plan members and beneficiaries should be provided with all relevant information for 
making, if applicable, fully informed choices. 
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Current and future retired workers are undoubtedly the chief beneficiaries of a sensible 
fund management policy. Being that the case, the correct incentives are in place for 
these beneficiaries to exert the necessary vigilance over the governing body (See Box 
13). However, in practice, this control can be only partial in view of: (i) The long-term 
nature of retirement saving, which discourages monitoring in the presence of myopia, 
high time preference or extreme economic uncertainty; (ii) The perception of retirement 
contributions as a tax in countries with a history of pension asset expropriation; (iii) The 
expectation that the State will take care of pension payments regardless of the financial 
situation of the system; (iv) The well-known informational asymmetries suffered by the 
bulk of beneficiaries, which might cloud the full understanding of the underlying 
financial operation. High fixed monitoring costs and free riding compound the problem; 
and (v) In the case of mandatory PPFs, if a decisive disciplining mechanism (the 
competition among funds and the ability of plan members to “vote with their feet”) is 
not available, seriously constraining the incentive to monitor.
11
  
 
It is clear that DC regimes offer a more propitious environment for scheme member 
activism because of the full correspondence between contributions and benefits through 
individual accounts. On the contrary, the collective ownership characterizing DB 
arrangements lessens the incentive to scrutinize fund operations. But in a case or the 
other, a good internal governance and oversight structure are needed to make up for the 
incomplete disciplining from the direct beneficiaries. This does not downplay the need 
to keep scheme members and beneficiaries fully and clearly informed about their 
accounts and the working of the system as a whole: first, many of them still have the 
incentives and financial skills to put this information to good use; and second, market 
discipline may gradually improve over time by means of well-designed financial 
literacy programs and easier access to information (internet use is a good example). 
 
The set of information to plan members and beneficiaries must include at minimum a 
quarterly statement or secure individual internet access on: (i) total contributions 
received in all previous years; (ii) detailed contributions received on a monthly basis per 
year; (iii) applicable wage base (month by month); (iv) rate of return for individual’s 
portfolio if applicable (DC schemes); (v) account balance if applicable (DC schemes) 
(vi) projected benefit at the retirement age based on explicitly indicated assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
Box 13: Public access to information in the Future Fund of Australia 
 
Section 8 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) requires the Future 
Fund Management Agency to publish detailed information about how it is organized 
and what decision making powers it has, what arrangements it makes for public 
involvement in its work, what types of documents it holds, and how the public can 
obtain access to these documents...  
 
…Categories of documents held by the Agency: 
                                                 
11
 Several of these obstacles to market discipline apply to a large extent to other financial intermediaries.  
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 Representations to portfolio ministers: the Agency holds representations made to 
the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Administration on matters relating 
to the operation of the Agency and related investment policies. 
  Working files: the Agency holds files dealing with policy and administration in the 
investment of funds in accordance with the Investment Mandate and investment 
policies issued by the Board. The documents on these files include internal and 
externally-provided investment advice, correspondence, analysis and policy advice 
by Agency officers and drafts of these and other documents. 
 Documents on internal departmental administration: Agency documents relating to 
staff and departmental organisation and operation include personal records, 
organisation and staffing records, financial and expenditure records, and internal 
operations such as office procedures and instructions. 
 
…The Agency‟s primary published document is its Annual Report which is available on 
the Agency‟s website as well as in the printed version. In accordance with the Future 
Fund Act, the Investment Mandate and investment policies are to be published on the 
Agency‟s website. 
…If a member of the public requests a document and access is approved, the Agency 
will provide copies of documents after the applicant pays any charges. 
 
Source:http://www.futurefund.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/965/FutureFundAnnu
alReport_v5.pdf 
 
 
 
3.5 Redress 
 
Scheme members and beneficiaries should be granted prompt statutory redress 
mechanisms through a layered approach – grievance procedures and redress policies 
handled through administrative means; redress to an ombudsman, redress through an 
arbitration body established for arbitrating disputes which cannot be resolved 
administratively for this purpose; and, as a last resort, through the courts.  
 
  
Current and future beneficiaries of the scheme should have the opportunity to challenge 
decisions and actions that unduly harm their personal interest. Given the mandatory and 
non-competitive nature of PPFs, this consumer protection service is particularly 
indispensable. Put another way, there cannot be any incentive to monitor unless a fair 
compensation is set in advance upon detection of member rights being violated (See 
Box 14).  
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Box 14: Redress in the National Insurance Fund of Jamaica 
In the National Insurance Fund of Jamaica web states that “If you are dissatisfied with 
the services you have received you should inform us by using our easily accessible 
complains system for prompt an effective response. 
 Use our suggestion books if you think the problem is not very urgent  
 If the problem must be handled expeditiously, ask to see a supervisor  
 All complaints will be investigated and a reply sent to you within two weeks of 
receipt of the complaint 
 Corrective measures to complaints will be taken for example 
- Apologies to customers 
- Removal/resolution of possible cause(s) of complaints  
 If you are not satisfied with the manner in which your complaints was dealt with 
you may contact the:  
The Permanent Secretary, 1F North Street, Kingston  
 If you are still dissatisfied with the handling of a complaint, an appeal may be 
directed to:  
The Manager, Standards and Monitoring Unit, 
Citizen‟s Charter Section, 2a Devon Road, Kingston 6  
 For further redress, complaints can also be directed to:  
The Parliamentary Ombudsman, 78 Harbour Street, Kingston” 
 
Source: http://www.mlss.gov.jm/pub/index.php?artid=74 
 
 
 
Redress usually involves : (i) contributions not recorded or not properly deposited by 
the employer; (ii) disagreements over benefit calculations; (iii) delayed or withheld 
disbursements; (iv) failure of the staff of the managing agency to abide by the 
operational policies set out, including service standards; and (v) requiring service fees 
not specified in the law. 
 
Less straightforward are the following implementation aspects:  
 
(i) The range of acts for which redress is appropriate. Individuals may file claims for 
actions or decisions taken in bad faith, such as negligence or dishonesty in providing 
timely, accurate and relevant disclosure on account balances, investment returns, 
administrative costs, and other items (including contributions and benefits, if under the 
jurisdiction of the governing body), as well as in relation to undue charges. Inadequate 
personal service or any sort of discriminatory treatment should also be a legitimate 
reason for complaint. As a general principle, complaints lodged with respect to issues 
affecting all members or retirees should be collectively redressed and not compensated 
on an individual basis, but instead should be assessed by the corresponding oversight 
bodies. To streamline the process, individual complaint and redress channels should 
only be open for individual cases (as opposed to claims affecting the whole universe of 
the scheme members); and 
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(ii) The structure of the consumer protection service. An independent office within the 
organizational structure of the Fund should be vested with the power to handle and 
resolve these matters following a written and publicly available procedure. If unsatisfied 
with the outcome, the complainant should have the right to an expedite and free-of-
charge investigation and satisfactory resolution (including a written explanation), and 
also to refer the matter to a financial service ombudsman or the ordinary courts 
(depending of the judicial system in place). The internal office of the Fund should 
maintain and disclose its records about the number, nature and resolution of complaints, 
and the governing body and external oversight bodies should periodically evaluate its 
performance.  
 
3.6 Regulation and Supervision 
 
The Fund should be under the specific regulation and supervision of the organism for 
the social security and other public pension schemes. It could also be subject to the 
oversight of a particular financial intermediary supervisory authority.  
 
 
Most countries’ Social Security schemes are subject to a separate regulatory authority 
and subject to a separate supervisory authority although there is a potential conflict of 
interest in having the State as its own regulator and the supervisor may have little 
incentive to carry out its mandate  
 
To avoid that and while at the international level this is not a common practice,
12
 PPFs 
should be subject to conventional regulation for at least three reasons: (i) the nature of 
their activity is fully compatible to that of private pension funds, which are under strict 
regulation worldwide. What is more, PPFs are prone to severe management failures that 
may be too costly to society; (ii) public sector-owned banks, another financial 
intermediary with the same ownership and incentive problems as PPFs, are under 
regulation in a number of countries; and (iii) a single PPF could be the dominant force 
in the domestic financial market.  To avoid this, the fund could be separated among a 
range of fund managers
13
 (see Box 15) or put management processes under mandatory 
supervision by a third-party entity; either specialized entities or financial market 
supervisors, such as central bank, insurance or security market supervisor (see Box 8 in 
Section 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The list of countries that implement supervision of public pension funds is growing slowly. This 
practice has been in place since recently in countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, India, and Morocco.  
13
 Carmichael and Palacios (2004). 
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Box 15: National Pension Funds of Sweden  
have no market dominance 
 
Sweden has five National Pension Funds: 
 First National Pension Fund (AP1),  
 Second National Pension Fund (AP2),  
 Third National Pension Fund (AP3), 
 Fourth National Pension Fund (AP4)  
 Sixth National Pension Fund (AP6). 
  
According to Musalem and Souto‟s Transparency and Governance Index (TGI) 
these PPF are between the funds with the highest scores of their sample.  AP1 and AP4 
are in the third and fourth position, respectively.  Not far below are the rest.  The assets 
of these PPFs represented 30% of the GDP in 2007.  Each of the first four PPFs 
reached about one fourth of the total assets. While AP6, bound by law to invest in 
venture capital of small and medium size firms, only represents 0,6% of the GDP. 
  
Source: Musalem and Souto (2009). 
 
 
 
Despite its potential benefits, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of this 
surveillance will depend on the particular institutional setting of the country and the 
personal qualities of the regulator appointed. Therefore, it is not advisable to 
concentrate the full oversight activity on the regulator, but instead keep a plural 
oversight structure, both internal and external.   
  
3.7 External Audit 
 
The Fund‟s accounting statements must be certified by an external auditor with 
credentials according to those specified by law. The audited statements should be 
disclosed along with all observations the external auditor might have made. 
 
 
Many PPFs, civil service schemes, and military and police are audited by the Auditor 
General by law (see Box 16).  As a complement, first-rate external auditors are 
equipped with the correct incentives to carry out an independent evaluation of the Fund. 
Firms in this market operate in a very competitive environment (despite a small number 
of players) in which reputation is a major asset. In addition, their multinational structure 
makes them less permeable to political interference. Of course, from theory and 
evidence, these contractual arrangements are not fully free from conflicts of interest, but 
the above conditions tend to minimize their likelihood relative to other oversight bodies 
because of the associated costs of opportunistic behavior.  Musalem and Souto (2009) 
found that over the 83 PPFs they analyzed, 38 were audited by external auditors and 11 
by their internal or state audit unit, while for 7 no report was found although there was 
an indication of the existence of an audit in the web.  For the 33% of the PPF there was 
no information regarding the issue. 
 
 44 
 
 
Box 16: Independent Auditor’s Report  
of the National Pension Service of South Korea 
 
To Minister of the Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs and the National Pension Fund 
Management Committee: 
February 6, 2009 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of the National Pension Service as of 
December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2007, and the related statements of income, 
retained earnings, and cash flow for the same said years ended. These financial 
statements are the responsibility of the Company‟s management. Our responsibility is to 
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.  
We audited in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the Republic of 
Korea... An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts 
and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the 
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation... 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fair, in all material 
respects, the financial position of the National Pension Service as of December 31, 
2008 and December 31, 2007, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the 
same years ended are in conformity with the National Pension Act, the Enforcement 
Decree of the National Pension Act, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, fund 
accounting regulations, and the accounting principles accepted in the Republic of 
Korea… 
Sung Bok Yoon 
Samjong KPMG Group CEO 
 
Source: 2008 Annual Report on Pension Fund Management, 
http://www.nps.or.kr/jsppage/english/npf_korea/npf_06_01.jsp 
 
 
     
3.8 Effective Accountability  
 
The governing body should be accountable to plan members and the competent 
authorities. Furthermore, the legal framework, the statute and the by-laws of the Fund 
should clearly state the criteria used to judge the performance of the governing body 
and the penalties applicable.  
 
Accountability means that the governing body should be liable for its actions and 
omissions with a view to the best interest of scheme members (see Box 17). In practice, 
however, accountability is extremely difficult to be made operational. The main benefit 
of an effective accountability framework is not the cost borne ex post by the manager in 
case of failure but the ex ante incentive to perform well so as to avoid any future 
penalty. For this to be a credible threat in the eyes of the governing body, the following 
conditions should be met: (i) All stakeholders should have access to the relevant 
information for judging performance; and (ii) The criteria upon which the governing 
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body may be held liable, as well as the resulting penalties, should be unambiguously 
specified in the legal and normative framework, and subsequently enforced.  
 
 
 
Box 17: Accountability of the 
National Insurance Fund of Trinidad and Tobago 
 
The National Insurance Fund of Trinidad and Tobago “is an organisation that honours 
its obligation to properly and effectively serve its stakeholders and manage a significant 
and growing public fund. As such, embedded in our legislation, policies and procedures 
are practices that promote good governance, accountability and ethical behaviour. 
Further, the tripartite composition of our Board of Directors ensures that all 
stakeholders are represented at the various levels of authority. From staff to managers 
and our various Board Committees, we practice strict adherence to disciplined and 
exacting processes that promote consistency, fairness, accountability and transparency 
in our operations.  
The timely submission of our annual reports, including audited financial statements, for 
each of our 36 years of existence and more recently the publication of these reports is 
cogent testimony of the value we place on accountability to the people of Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
We recognize that this is one of our key traits that builds public confidence and are 
constantly on our guard to ensure that this trust is not shaken. To this end, during the 
last year we have reviewed and tightened our procedures and processes with respect to 
insurance administration, tendering, resolution of audit queries and promoting 
information security”. 
 
http://www.nibtt.co.tt/2009/NIB%20Annual%20Report%202%202%2009.pdf 
 
 
 
One major obstacle, common to the whole fund management industry, is the difficulty 
to screen good from bad managers, which in turn is explained by the difficulty to 
accurately measure inputs and outputs. On practical grounds, it is convenient first to 
separate dishonesty from incompetence. Dishonest acts are those committed deliberately 
by abusing the powers of office to reap personal rents at the expense of the pension 
scheme. Examples are the use of the position in the governing body to secure a contract 
with a related party at non-market values, conducting illicit financial transactions using 
the Fund’s technical or financial resources, and other forms of self-dealing. 
Incompetence, on the other hand, refers to the failure to act with due skill, care, and 
diligence, reflecting on abnormally low gross returns, excessive risk-taking, or high 
operating costs. While the uncovering of a self-dealing transaction can be objectively 
documented, incompetence is more intricate to prove, since bad outcomes can arise 
from either ineptitude or negligence on the part of the fund manager or from exogenous 
factors such as market downturns or cost inflation. The use of financial benchmarks 
may be complemented with cost benchmarks (for example, other institutional investors 
of similar size and business profile).  
 
Some caution should be exerted in evaluating and punishing misbehavior. In particular, 
attention should be called on the following: (i) Negative performance reviews should 
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not be based purely on absolute returns or on a short time span. Oversight bodies should 
instead penalize consistently bad relative performance measured over a long period 
(say, at least 3 years), except for extraordinarily deficient outcomes calling for urgent 
intervention; (ii) Penalties for self-dealing should be harsher than for incompetence. 
Incompetence should lead to dismissal (or voluntary resignation) of the governing body 
members liable for the defective outcome, while both contract termination and penal 
actions should apply on self-dealing; and (iii) In self-dealing accusations brought to the 
courts, defendant governing body members should be provided official legal protection 
to cover the costs of litigation regardless of whether it is in or out of office. Only when 
bad faith is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the judiciary, the Fund may require full 
reimbursement of all expenses. This clause is intended to assure that the governing body 
is equipped with adequate incentives to pursue its goal of maximizing risk-adjusted net 
returns.  
 
In schemes where there exists limited personal liability of governing body members, 
effective dismissal powers, and lack of independent oversight bodies, public 
accountability based on reputational costs matters significantly. That could be alleviated 
by the introduction of codes of conduct, personal disclosure requirements of material 
interest, and recusal procedures where conflicts of interest may apply. Hiring highly 
respected market players to occupy seats in the governing body is of utmost importance.  
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